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Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations
INTRODUCTION

A fundamental premise of Anglo-American jurisprudence, that
settlements should always be encouraged, 1 routinely is applied to class
action suits. 2 However, because the class action device is unique and
does not fit into traditional adjudicatory models,3 the simple extension
of this policy to class actions presents special problems.4
The class action suit is generally thought of as a long, complex,
1. The judicial policy of encouraging settlements is evident in both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules.of Civil Procedure
authorizes the court to schedule pretrial conferences to discuss, among other topics, "the possibility of settlements or extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c)(7).
The advisory committee note expressly recognizes the need to encourage settlements as early as
possible in litigation proceedings in order to "eas[e] crowded court dockets and [save the money
and time] of the litigants and the Judicial System." FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c) advisory committee
note (1983). See also 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 16.17 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence precludes litigants from establishing liability with "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations." FED. R. Evm. 408. Rule 408 is designed to promote "the public
policy favoring the compromise and settlements of disputes." FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory com·
mittee note. See also IO MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, at § 408.02. A policy that encourages the settlement of suits prior to litigation benefits both society and the individual litigants.
Settlements avoid the expense and time required for a full trial. These savings can be especially
significant when dockets are crowded and public finances are lean: a 1982 study estimated that
the average cost ofa full jury trial in federal district court ranged from $5843 to $12,035. James,
The Cost of Civil Litigation, 22 JUDGES' J. 24 (Spring 1983). In addition to monetary savings,
litigants are able to avoid the mental anguish associated with trial. Finally, settlements provide a
means for decongesting the trial and appellate dockets since they are final dispositions and offer
no prospects for appeals. See Bedlin & Nejelski, Unsettling Issues About Settling Civil Litigation:
Examining ''Doomsday Machines," "Quick Looks" and Other Modest Proposals, 68 JUDICATURE
9, 11 (1984).
2. See Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 114 (7th Cir. 1976) (the court should not attempt
to decide the merits of a controversy in a class action suit in which the parties have reached a
settlement); Georgevick v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 196 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (class action settlements
should be encouraged), vacated, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985); Heit v. Amrep Corp., 82 F.R.D.
130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (according great weight to both the general policy favoring settlements
and counsels' representations that the proposed settlement represented the "best available
compromise").
3. The class action device enables courts to hear the claims of a large group of individuals
through class representatives and class attorneys. Thus, the class at large is not present during
the litigation. Unlike the traditional model where the individual client controls the conduct of
the litigation, the absentee plaintiffs must rely on the class representatives and class attorneys for
the adequate representation of their rights. The class action device differs radically from the
traditional model, then, because the absentee class does not control the litigation but yet is bound
by the result.
4. See Part I infra. This Note discusses the potential abuses of class action settlements only
in the context of plaintiff suits. See generally Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A
Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U. REv. 492 (1982); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982); Developments in the Law - Conflicts ofInterest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts of Interest]; Developments in
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thorough procedure. 5 In reality, the class action suit that is fully tried
is a rarity. 6 Most class actions are settled before the merits are judged
in court. Because the resulting class action settlement can have a major impact on both plaintiffs and defendants,7 and because class action
settlements pose unique problems not ordinarily encountered in traditional litigation, 8 pretrial settlements must be carefully supervised and
adequately reviewed.
The current pretrial settlement process often leaves unprotected
the substantial interests9 ·involved in a class action case. The process is
particularly vulnerable to abuse when the class action suit is brought
for economic, as opposed to ideological, reasons. 1 For example, with-

°

the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Class Action
Developments].
5. The class action suit has been characterized as entailing dimensions "beyond anything
seen in Anglo-American courts in terms of size, complexity, and longevity." Miller, OfFrankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class Action Problem, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 664, 667 (1979).
6. A statistical study of class action suits filed in the District of Columbia found that in 63%
of the cases the issue of class certification never reached the court. Of those cases in which
certification was granted, 55% were disposed of in favor of the defendant on preliminary motions. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1135-38
(1974). Another empirical study focused on the incidence of shareholder and class action suits
brought against the 190 largest publicly owned corporations as listed in the 1975 Fortune Magazine rankings. The study showed that 71 % of all suits filed were settled before trial, 17% were
dismissed, and another 4% were denied class action status. Only 4% of all class action and
stockholder derivative suits were fully litigated. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Empirical Study (II)]; see also Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence
ofShareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REv. 306 [hereinafter
cited as Empirical Study (I)].
7. The impact on defendants may include a large damage award and a tainted public image.
See Part I. A. 1 infra. According to the Jones study, Empirical Study (II), supra note 6, at 547 &
567, of the 228 class action and shareholder derivative suits studied, 193 (85%) involved a monetary settlement; 164 suits, involving 23 settlements, amounted to over one million dollars each.
The impact on plaintiffs may include inadequate representation of their claims by the class representatives. See Part I. B. infra.
8. Class actions typically involve important issues that have a significant impact on society.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (school desegregation), cert
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d
1106 (7th Cir.) (customer fraud), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978) (employment discrimination), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
9. See notes 3 & 4 supra and accompanying text.
10. This Note does not address the abuses that may arise in class action suits brought primarily for ideological purposes. Instead, the Note deals exclusively with the potential for abuse
inherent in those class action suits prompted largely by economic considerations. Plaintiff class
action suits that are economically motivated have a recognized potential for abuse. They have
been depicted by some as "lawyers'" lawsuits in which the "client," the class, serves as little
more than the means to generate fees. See Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir.
1978), ajfd., 444 U.S. 472 (1980). As the Supreme Court observed:
That there is a potential for misuse of the class-action mechanism is obvious. Its benefits to
class members are often nominal and symbolic, with persons other than class members becoming the chief beneficiaries. But the remedy for abuses does not lie in denying the relief
••• but with re-examination of Rule 23 as to untoward consequences.
Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Ber-
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out court supervision, unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys can use the
class action allegation to extract an unjustifiably high settlement from
a defendant willing to settle for the nuisance value of the suit. 11 The
class action process is also abused when the class attorney, who has
already settled the case, artificially increases the amount of her fee. 12
In addition, because the economic interests of the attorney and the
class may conflict, the attorney may negotiate settlement terms that do
not reflect the interests of the absentee class. 13 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 attempts to address this inherent potential for abuse that
exists during the pretrial stage, when there is no court supervision of
the class suit, by requiring that all class action settlements be approved
by the court. 14 However, in practice, the current judicial scrutiny of
class action settlements neither prevents abuse nor effectively protects
the interests of the absentee class. 15
This Note explores the problem of abuse of the class action device
during the pretrial settlement process. Part I analyzes the underlying
sources of potential abuse in pretrial settlement negotiations. Part II
assesses the adequacy of the standards currently used by courts to detect collusive class action settlements. Part III concludes that the appointment of a neutral third-party guardian to oversee the pretrial
nard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 n.13 (1981) (citing Comment, Judicial Screening of Class Action Communications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 699-704 (1980); 88 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1917-20 (1975));
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The TwentyThird Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971); Simon, Class Actions - Useful
Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973). When the class action suit has been economically motivated, courts have sought to prevent abuse by looking closely at counsel fees. On
occasion, they have rejected percentage fee contracts and settlements in which the attorney's fee
is part of the negotiated settlement. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.
1977) (rejecting settlement where attorney's fee was part of settlement); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court has obligation to review the size of class counsel's
attorney's fee for reasonableness); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (court makes its own determination of the reasonable value of the attorneys' services and
disregards contingent percentage fee contracts setting attorney fees). Nonetheless, examples of
egregious abuses of the class action settlement process are not uncommon. See notes 93 infra and
accompanying text. Moreover, as a recent case illustrates, even the most reputable members and
firms of the plaintiffs' bar are not immune to the temptation of using the class action mechanism
for personal economic profit. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
affd. in part and revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984), lawyers claimed 40% or $21,000,000
of the $50,000,000 class award. "Three or four of the most prominent antitrust attorneys," 98
F.R.D. at 73, were implicated in an egregious example of attorney fee abuse: almost all of the
legal tasks of the class suit were duplicated and triplicated, 98 F.R.D. at 70, 75; there were more
attorneys involved in the litigation than parties at interest, 98 F.R.D. at 68; and at least one-third
of the firms intervened after the defendant settled, 98 F.R.D. at 74. During the two years following the settlement, lawyers managed to deplete the class settlement fund by one-third.
11. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
12. See In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (of a total fee
petition for $20,700,000, only $3,000,000 was accounted for by legal work done prior to the
settlement), affd. in part and revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
13. See notes 33-40 infra and accompanying text.
14. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e).
15. See generally Part II infra.
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negotiation process furthers the judicial policy of encouraging settlements while protecting the interests of the absentee class.
I.

THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS

The Supreme Court has emphasized that class actions "serve an
important function in our system of civil justice." 16 One benefit of
class actions is that they enable private individuals who share legal
claims too small to justify the cost of individual litigation to vindicate
their interests in a single lawsuit. 17 As Justice Douglas has stated,
class actions provide "one of the few legal remedies the small claimant
has against those who command the status quo." 18 Society as a whole
also benefits because class action litigation can ensure greater compliance with society's laws and regulations and promote the efficient use
of scarce judicial resources. 19
In order to ensure that these benefits are not lost, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that the requirements of the class action
suit must be strictly observed. 20 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure sets forth the following four requirements: (1) numerosity
of claims; (2) common issues of law and fact; (3) typicality of the representative party's claim; and (4) fair and adequate representation of
the class' interests. 21 The last requirement- adequate representation
- is central in achieving substantive and procedural fairness in class
action suits. 22 This is because in class action suits, unlike traditional
litigation, the plaintiffs do not act individually to protect their interests; rather, members of the absentee class rely on the class attorney
and representative to pursue their interests vigorously. 23
16. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); see also Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (the legal profession relies on the "private attorney general,"
facilitated by rule 23, to vindicate legal rights).
17. See Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) advisory committee note (1983).
18. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19. See Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1353; see also General Tel. Co. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (class action device conserves the resources of both the court and the
parties); Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (aggregation of individual claims can provide remedies for injuries left unredressed by regulatory action of government); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1974) (policy of rule 23 is to
"insure effectuation of the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy").
20. The requirements of rule 23 are "indispensable" and must be met at all stages of the
proceeding. East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). If a trial
court judge finds that the requirements of the rule have not been met, she is obliged to dismiss the
suit. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 160 (1982); Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403.
21. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a).
22. See Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1471-75.
23. See MOORE·s FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 11 23.07[1] (2d ed. 1985) ("In determining the question [of adequacy] the court inquires into two matters: first, the adequacy of the
representative, and second, the adequacy of his counsel.") (footnote omitted); see also note 3
supra; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940):
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The Supreme Court has made clear that the adequacy requirement, as well as due process of law, 24 is satisfied if there has been a
"full and fair consideration of the common issue[s]" 25 adjudicated on
behalf of the absentee class. Thus, in class action settlements, fairness
is contingent on the ability of the class representatives to air all relevant issues during the negotiation process. Unfortunately, the inherent structural weaknesses of the class action suit - strong incentives
to settle combined with the relative autonomy of the class action attorney - create a situation in which the interests of the class may not be
adequately explored or protected in the settlement discussions. This
makes it possible for the class to be bound by an unjust settlement.
Settlements that do not inure to the benefit of the absentee class can
seriously undermine the class action concept.
A.

The Interests of the Various Participants in a Class Action

The interests of the absentee class and those of the class representatives - the class action attorney and the named representative may conflict during the pretrial settlement negotiations. The class action attorney and the class action representative often have strong incentives to settle before trial. The absentee class, in contrast, seeks to
recover as large an award as possible, sometimes attainable only after
prolonged litigation. This divergence of interests is not fully checked
by the adversary, because the defendant is often strongly motivated to
pursue a settlement.26 Thus, the settlement may accommodate the interests of the defendant and the class action representatives but not
those of the class as a whole.
1.

The Defendant

The defendant has both direct and indirect financial incentives to
settle. Its most direct and immediate financial objectives are to minimize the amount of the damages eventually awarded to the class and
to reduce litigation expenses. 27 The indirect costs of full-scale litigaIt is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not designated as a party••••
To these general rules is a recognized exception that •.. the judgment in a [class action] may
bind members of the class ..••
24. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 23.07(1] (2d ed. 1985) ("(I]n Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme Court expressly made clear what had previously been implied: Adequate representation of interests is ordinarily required by due process as a condition to according
a class action judgment binding effect against purported members of the class.") (footnotes
omitted).
25. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
26. See Part I. A. 1 infra.
27. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REV. 215, 247 (1983); Jones, supra note 6, at 546;
Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114 & n.4
(1976). Litigation expenses include out-of-pocket costs as well as the opportunity cost to the
company of diverting its time and resources from productive activities to supervising the lawsuit.
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tion, however, can also be consequential. Consumer goodwill can be
harmed by the adverse publicity that often accompanies class action
litigation. Also, the possible disclosure of "dirty linen" during the
trial process can damage the defendant's community standing. In addition, the discovery process can disrupt the day-to-day operations of
defendant institutions and corporations. By settling, the defendant
can minimize most of these indirect costs and avoid the risk of a large
damage award.
2.

The Named Plaintiff

The system governing the payment of attorneys' fees provides the
named plaintiff with an economic incentive to settle before trial. If the
suit is unsuccessful, the named plaintiff is responsible for legal expenses. 28 The representative remains ultimately liable for such expenses even if the lawyer violates the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and "advance[s] or guarantee[s] financial assistance to
his client."29 Only if the class wins or settles are the expenses shared
by the class, since attorneys' fees are then taken from the common
fund. 30 Thus, by settling, the representative avoids risking the personal liability that accompanies failure of the class suit at trial.
The policy that each class member, including the named representative, shares equally in the class award31 - from settlement or litiga28. The nained representative is also responsible for the costs of notifying the class. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1981) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL CODE]. Although the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct generally address concerns applicable to the traditional lawyerclient relationship, many of their principles can be applied to the class action suit. See note 35
infra. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that the client is ultimately liable for the costs oflitigation. See MODEL CODE, supra, at DR 5-103(B). But see notes
34-35 infra and accompanying text.
30. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gernert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980):
[T]his Court has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common
fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee from the fund as a whole. The common fund doctrine reflects the traditional
practice in courts of equity, and it stands as a well-recognized exception to the general
principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees. The doctrine rests on
the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to court
costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense. Jurisdiction over the fund
involved in the litigation allows a court to prevent this inequity by assessing attorney's fees
against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately among those benefited by the
suit.
(Citations omitted).
31. Under the common fund doctrine, all members of the class must bear the costs and share
the rewards of the fund equally. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gernert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-82 (1980);
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 264-65 n.39 (1975). The Court in Boeing
explained that unequal shares of the settlement fund are appropriate only in cases in which the
number of claimants is small, benefits can be traced with some accuracy, and the cost of the
litigation can be shifted, with some confidence, to those benefiting. These characteristics, the
Court noted, are not usually present where "litigants simply vindicate a general social grievance." 444 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263-67 n.39).
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tion - provides another incentive for the named plaintiff to settle.
For the named plaintiff, the risk of losing at trial is counterbalanced
solely by the chance of an award larger than that offered for settlement. However, because all members of the class, including the
named plaintiff, share equally in the additional reward, the incremental benefit of a larger award may not sufficiently compensate the plaintiff for her extra efforts in litigating the case. Thus, the named plaintiff
may choose to minimize the cost of her involvement by settling
promptly rather than becoming involved in prolonged litigation. 32
3.

The Class Attorney

Like the named plaintiff, the class attorney may have incentives to
settle rather than litigate a class action lawsuit. Obviously, the costs of
full-scale litigation are far greater than those of pretrial settlement. In
theory, the attorney is not at financial risk if the litigation is unsuccessful, because the named representative is then responsible for paying
her legal expenses. 33 In practice, however, the named representative is
often a private individual who is unable to reimburse the attorney for
the full cost of the class action. In these situations, the class attorney
has usually advanced the costs of the class action, expecting to be reimbursed only if the suit is successful. 34 Thus, if the attorney takes the
case to trial and loses, she will be out the time and money required to
litigate a class action suit. 35 If the class attorney settles the suit, how32. This analysis can be extended to the situation of individual class members. If class members seek to maximize their income, and iftheir individual stake in the class action is low relative
to the costs of supervision and direct involvement, the class member will remain a passive participant. Rosenfield, supra note 27, at 114-15.
33. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
34. Practicing attorneys have observed that "in most class actions costs are carried by plaintiffs' counsel. . . . As a practical matter, the expenses of class litigation are beyond the means of
most plaintiffs. Thus, most class actions go forward under contingent fees with the lawyers carrying most or all of the costs." Cooper & Kirkham, Class Action Conflicts, LmGATION, Winter
1981, at 35, 36. See generally Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: Fools for Clients?, 4 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 243 (1980); Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner: Continued Neglect
By the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1047
(1981).
35. Maintenance of litigation - an attorney advancing costs and litigation expenses - is
permissible under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as long as the client remains
liable for repayment. MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 5-8. The drafters of the Model Rules
recognized that maintenance of litigation, irrespective of its outcome, may be proper in class
actions. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 18(e)(2) & comment (1983); see
also Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1618-23 (arguing that ban on maintenance in the
class action context is an unjustifiable obstacle to class suits). Since the major cost of the class
action litigation is the attorney's own fee, maintenance of class actions is much like a contingent
fee arrangement. As in contingent fee contracts, the class attorney will most likely recover a full
fee only if the class suit is successful. Thus, the attorney, not the class, absorbs the full cost of
defeat in class action suits. The attorney therefore has a tremendous incentive to settle, particularly in high risk litigation. The speculative nature of class action litigation has prompted several
authors to characterize the class action attorney as an "entrepreneur." See Coffee, supra note 27,
at 231; Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 47, 60 (1975); Herzel & Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class
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ever, she will be entitled under the common fund doctrine to recover
her full fee from the settlement fund. 36 By settling, then, the attorney
obtains a certain fee and eliminates the risk that she will incur significant expenses for which she will not be compensated. 37
Even if the prospects for success in the litigation are high, the attorney may nonetheless have a strong incentive to settle. As Judge
Friendly observed in the context of a shareholders' derivative action,
the class attorney's financial interest lies in the amount of her award
less the time and effort required to produce it. 38 The attorney may
therefore benefit more from a "small settlement . . . bearing a higher
ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger recovery obtained
only after extensive discovery, a long trial and an appeal."39 Thus,
even the prospect of a large recovery may not be sufficient to cause the
class attorney to forgo a settlement that is unfavorable to the members
of the absentee class.40
Actions, LITIGATION, Winter 1981, at 25. Professor Coffee has argued that one way to remedy
the potential for abuse that exists in class action suits is to view the class action as entrepreneurial
litigation and allow the attorney to acquire a property interest in that litigation. Under Coffee's
proposed system, an attorney could no longer intervene in a class suit that had been settled; the
attorney who originally filed would maintain exclusive control of the class claim and be the
exclusive recipient of the resulting fee. According to Coffee, this would reduce the need for
attorneys to generate a multitude of class action suits in order to spread the risks of an unsuccessful suit. Herzel and Hagan argue that the present "lodestar'' formula - which takes irito account the number of hours worked, the hourly rate, the difficulty of the litigation, and the quality
of the attorney's work - gives attorneys a strong incentive to increase and even pad their hours.
By contrast, they argue that percentage fees reward lawyers for greater recoveries and penalize
them for excess hours. Arguing that "the best discipline is self-interest," they conclude that
acceptance of contingent fees in class actions would do much to minimize abuse of the class
action suit. Herzel & Hagan, supra, at 25. These views of the class action suit focus on the
interests of the class attorney - what she would or would not do if rule 23 were amended. Such
a view runs counter to the more traditional view of the class action attorney as a fiduciary for the
class, responsible for the interests of the class as a whole. See note 54 supra and accompanying
text. Court-mandated notice of the settlement to the class members, for example, emphasizes
this fiduciary responsibility. See note 88 infra and accompanying text. The interest in ensuring
that small claimants have access to the courts is also based on the fiduciary concept. See notes
17-18 supra and accompanying text. The analysis in this Note is based on the fiduciary model,
which underlies the courts' settlement hearing standards. See generally Part II infra.
36. Under the common fund doctrine, the attorneys' fees are deducted from the settlement
fund before any class member receives an award. See note 31 supra.
37. See Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 1976) ("[T]he spectre
persists .•. that the plaintiff's attorney may accept an insufficient judgment for the class in trade
for immediate and certain compensation for himself in the form of legal fees deducted from the
total available funds proffered by defendant ....").
38. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972). This simple formula applies to
traditional as well as class action lawsuits. However, in the traditional model, the client closely
controls the direction of the litigation. By contrast, in the class action model, neither the class
nor the named plaintiff exercises active control over the attorney's conduct. See Part I. B. infra.
Hence in a class action the attorney has greater discretion in determining the amount of her fee.
Cf. note 10 supra (discussing fee abuse in economically motivated class action suits).
40. See note 37 supra.
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The Class

The class and its representatives may share incentives to settle: the
public prestige and status in claiming a favorable settlement in what is
often a high-stakes and high-visibility controversy; and the security of
some financial recovery. Nonetheless, the desire of the class representatives to settle will ordinarily exceed that of the class members. Since
the representatives must invest the time and resources needed to conduct the litigation, they are more likely to be interested in receiving a
quick settlement and minimizing their expenses.41 Class members, on
the other hand, may feel that they can receive a more favorable valuation of their claim from a jury than from negotiating parties infected
with a strong pro-settlement bias.42 The risk-averse nature of class
representatives may therefore induce them to settle when the class
members would prefer to present their claims to a neutral party for
decision.
B.

The Lack of Checks on the Class Attorney's Conduct

The conflict of interests between the class and its representatives
does not alone subvert the settlement process. The structure of the
class action suit places the attorney in a situation in which she can too
easily use the class action device, intentionally or unintentionally, to
further her own interests. The ethical attorney cannot resort to the
traditional guidelines for a conflict of interest - informed client guidance and the codes of legal ethics - because these rules do not easily
apply in the class action context. Furthermore, the unethical attorney
can too easily circumvent the safeguards of rule 23. These weaknesses
lead to abuse of the class action process.
In traditional litigation, attorneys can resolve conflicts that are not
totally disabling 43 by advising the client of the perceived conflict and
allowing him to make informed choices regarding the litigation.44 Be41. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
42. Assessing the value of negotiated settlement awards involves evaluating the negotiating
parties' perceived probability of winning (or losing) during a jury trial and their estimates of the
litigation costs, monetary as well as nonmonetary, that can be saved by settling. See Rosenfield,
supra note 27. Guessing the size of a jury award entails predicting both the probability of winning the class suit and the jury's perception of the value of the class claim. In both cases, attorneys' fees are deducted before the award fund is distributed to the class. There are two scenarios
in which the class may be better off with a jury award than with a settlement award. First, if the
representatives negotiating on behalf of the class are biased toward settling, there will be a strong
tendency to undervalue the class claim during the settlement negotiations. Second, if the class
gets better legal representation in exchange for fees paid to conduct a jury trial, the class award
may be significantly higher than it would be if the attorney had negotiated a settlement.
43. If the attorney faces an inpermissible conflict of interest, she should remove herself from
the case. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment 1 (1983).
44. See MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 5-1; EC 5-16; DR 5-!0l(A). A lawyer should
explain to a client the potential advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a class suit as opposed
to a private claim. As a class plaintiff, a client can minimize the costs of successful litigation and
indicate broad support for his individual position. However, as a class plaintiff, the client will
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cause the "client" in a class action suit is the class, communication is
costly; thus, meaningful client-attorney communication is not practicable.45 Moreover, communication with the class in pretrial settlement proceedings may jeopardize the class's bargaining position if
secrecy and confidentiality are essential to the negotiations.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility fails to provide
meaningful guidance to the ethical class action attorney faced with a
conflict of interest. The current Code is oriented toward traditional
litigation, in which the client is easily defined and that client pays the
fee.46 Neither feature, however, is present in class action litigation.47
Moreover, even though the Code addresses concerns that are pertinent
to some aspects of class actions, 48 it fails to provide proper guidance
for the class attorney involved in pretrial negotiations. 49 This lack of
meaningful guidelines leaves the attorney to her own judgment and
thus frees her to make choices that benefit herself instead of the class.
The rule 23 safeguards also fail as an effective check on the attorney's conduct. One of the rule's requirements is that "the representative parties . . . fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." 5° Courts have construed this language as charging the named
class representative with the duty of insuring that the class attorney
fulfills her responsibilities to the class. 51 However, in practice, the
ability of the class representative to control the class attorney's conduct is severely limited.
First, courts have never adequately defined the proper allocation of
decisionmaking authority between the class representative and attarrecover no more than any other class member, and will be obliged to produce documents, submit
to interrogatories, and assume liability for costs and fees if the litigation is unsuccessful. See
Cooper & Kirkham, supra note 34, at 35-36.
45. Take, for example, the seminal case of Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
which involved a class of approximately six million odd-lot stock buyers whose average damage
claim was estimated at less than four dollars. Communication with such a numerous class will
undoubtedly tend to be formalistic and meaningless to an attorney faced with a conflict of
interest.
46. See generally O'Kelley, Class Actions, Proposals for New Rules ofProfessional Responsibility, LITIGATION, Winter 1979, at 25; Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions: Problems,
Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 KY. L.J. 787 (1982-83); Waid, supra note 34, at 1047-50;
Conflicts of Interest, supra note 4, at 1446.
47. See note 30 supra and accompanying text; notes 52-66 infra and accompanying text.
48. Issues addressed by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility relevant to class action litigation are: client solicitation, see MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at DR 2-101; avoiding
conflict of interest, see id., at DR 5-103; and communication with potential class members, see
id., at DR 7-104.
49. The problem faced by an attorney in pretrial settlement negotiations is how to represent
the class adequately in the face of a potential conflict of interest. See notes 33-40 supra and
accompanying text. Neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct address this problem.
50. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4) (emphasis added).
51. See National Assn. of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 34446 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
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ney. 52 Both the class representative and the class action attorney are
considered to be fiduciaries for the class. 53 However, the class attol'ney has the added responsibilities of acting as a fiduciary for the class
representative and furthering the public interest. 54 Viewing the duties
of the class attorney as coincident with the policy ends of class action
litigation, courts have tended to allow the class counsel to control the
direction of the suit. 55 For example, an attorney may propose for
court approval a settlement that the class representative opposes, 56 or
decide not to appeal a court-approved settlement that the representative deems unfavorable. 57 Moreover, if the conduct of the class attorney dissatisfies the class representative, the representative cannot
dismiss the attorney, but must instead petition the court for redress. 58
Second, in many instances the class representative lacks the necessary knowledge, interest, or ability to exercise vigorous control over
the conduct of the litigation. 59 To counter the tendency of class representatives to defer to the class attorney, courts have established guidelines disqualifying certain attorneys who have close ties with the class
representative. For example, neither business associates nor relatives
of the class representative can serve as the attorney. 6° Courts have
52. See Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("The status of unnamed members of an uncertified class has always been difficult to
define accurately."); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176·
78 (5th Cir. 1978) (Noting that the decision to appeal does not rest entirely with the class attor·
ney or named plaintiffs, the court commented that in "the class action context • . . no clear
concept of the allocation of decision-making responsibility between the attorney and the class
members has yet emerged."), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
53. See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973).
54. Authors have emphasized that class action litigation should seek to promote the public
interest as well as the aims of the individual class members. See, e.g., Class Action Developments,
supra note 4, at 1353; see also notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176-79 (5th
Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832
n.9 (3d Cir. 1973). But see Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 353 n.13 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the courts for allowing "clientless" litigation).
56. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976).
57. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982).
58. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981).
59. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1203 ("[A]s a practical matter once a class is certified, named
plaintiffs generally are neither highly motivated nor well situated to monitor the congruence
between counsel's conduct and class preferences.").
60. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that "attorneys
who are partners or spouses of named plaintiffs, or who are themselves members of the class of
plaintiffs should be subject to a per se rule of disqualification"); Kramer v. Scientific Control
Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (Plaintiff class representa·
tive's law partner cannot act as class attorney.).
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also barred the class action attorney from being a class representative
or a class member. 61 In spite of the courts' efforts to regulate this
aspect of class action suits, however, instances of phantom class representatives are not uncommon. 6 2
The economic incentives of the class action structure also discourage vigorous supervision of the class attorney by any individual class
member. 63 Because the individual class member's settlement award
tends to be small, 64 no member is financially motivated to expend the
time and effort required to supervise the attorney closely. Moreover,
any increase in the settlement award derived from close supervision of
the attorney must be shared with all other class members, making it
unlikely that the benefits of supervision will outweigh the costs. 65
As a result of these factors, it is the attorney who typically determines the interests of the class and the parameters of the class action
suit. The lack of class control over the attorney's conduct can allow
the class attorney to become the de facto representative of the class. 66
Given the divergent interests of the attorney and the class, an ethical
attorney may not be able to maintain the neutrality needed to represent the class's interest adequately in settlement negotiations. Moreover, without adequate safeguards, an unethical attorney can
deliberately use the class action mechanism to her personal advantage.
II.

THE JUDICIAL REsPONSE TO CLASS ACTION ABUSES

The structural weaknesses of rule 23 - the lack of court supervision, the strong incentives for parties to settle, and the relative auton61. See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977).
62. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982) (The
trial judge prompted the class attorney to find an adequate class representative who could meet
the federal jurisdiction diversity requirements. The judge's action was challenged as an abuse of
discretion. The appellate court rejected the challenge, although it did not "condone" the practice. According to the circuit court, the better practice would have been to hold a hearing with
counsel and all potential class representatives in order to determine if any class member could
serve as class representative.); Charal v. Andes, 81 F.R.D. 99, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (emphasizing
that attorneys should not dominate the litigation and use plaintiffs only as a "key to the courthouse door''); Smith v. Josten's American Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154, 160 (D. Kan. 1978)
(attorney had not contacted the named representative for over six months), affd., 624 F.2d 125
(10th Cir. 1980).
63. See Handler, supra note 10, at 10:
[I]t is the attorneys, not the class members, who are the true beneficiaries and the real
parties in interest. This plain fact is even more apparent in large antitrust settlements where
many millions of dollars in fees are at stake .... [I]t is the small purchasers, the supposed
beneficiaries of class actions, who must pay these fees and other costs.
64. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
65. Cf. notes 31-32supra and accompanying text (The common fund doctrine requires class
members to share the costs of litigation as well as the rewards.).
66. This situation creates the potential for conflicts of interests. See Leib v. 20th Century
Corp., 61 F.R.D. 592, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ("An attorney who prosecutes a class action with
unfettered discretion becomes, in fact, the representative of the class. This is an unacceptable
situation because of the possible conflicts of interest involved.").

320

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:308

omy of the class action attorney - create a serious potential for abuse
in the pretrial settlement negotiations of class action suits. Rule 23(e)
charges the court with ensuring that the class action device is not
abused. 67 Yet the practical options available to the court under rule
23 are severely limited. 68 The result is that the rule neither prevents
abuse nor allows courts to redress the grievances of the absentee class
adequately when abuse has already occurred.
Under rule 23, courts must approve any negotiated settlement
before it is given binding effect. This requirement is established by
section (e) of the rule, which provides in full that "[a] class action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." 69 Section (e) was adopted to preclude abuse of the class action process and
to ensure that the procedural rights of the absentee class are not compromised.70 Under section (e), the court is a fiduciary for the absentee
class and the ultimate guardian of its interests. 71
The test courts have used to determine if rule 23(e) policies have
been satisfied is whether a class action settlement is "fair, adequate
and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties. "72 This test involves two inquiries: substantive (Is the settlement
fair, adequate, and reasonable?) and procedural (Was the settlement
67. See notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
68. See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
70. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1122 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d
114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir.
1971); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 679-80 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd., 577 F.2d 335
(5th Cir. 1978).
71. "The ultimate responsibility of course is committed to the district court in whom, as the
guardian of the rights of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as adjudicative,
power." Greenfield v. Villagers Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973), quoted in Shelton v.
Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1306 n.20 (4th Cir. 1978); cj, Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Consequently, in reviewing a proposed
settlement the district court should always consider the possibility that an agreement reached by
the class attorney is not in the best interest of the class."); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, 74
F.R.D. 61, 66 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("Before approving the compromise, the Court must in every
instance determine that the proposal is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of all who will be
affected by it."); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1797
(1972) ("In general, the standard used by the courts in evaluating a compromise is that the
proposal must be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of all those who will be affected by
it. ... The main judicial concern is that the rights of the passive class members not be jeopardized by the proposed action.").
72. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975). See generally City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (1977) (supplement to c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969-86)) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION].
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the product of collusion between the parties?). 73
A.

The Substantive Inquiry

The substantive inquiry requires the court to assess the fairness of
the negotiated settlement. To accomplish this, courts have developed
a test that balances the strength of the plaintiff's case, the terms of the
settlement, and the defendant's ability to pay. 74 In theory, this balancing test should produce a just result, since the court must consider the
interests and rights of all parties involved. In practice, however, the
balancing test has produced only a superficial examination of the pretrial settlement.75 Thus, the substantive inquiry ordinarily has not revealed whether the settlement adequately represents the interests of
the absentee class.
The substantive test is difficult to apply. The test requires the
court to balance the fairness of the settlement against the worthiness of
the plaintiff's suit. 76 But "fairness" and "worthiness" are vague terms
that do not lend themselves to precise valuation. 77 Moreover, the
court's task is made even more difficult because it must evaluate the
fairness of the settlement and the plaintiff's likelihood of success on
the basis of sketchy pretrial information.78
Yet it is not just the difficulties encountered in applying the balanc73. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1220 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
74. See note 72 supra and cases cited therein.
75. See notes 76-84 infra and accompanying text.
76. According to the MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 72, at § 1.46, the test
is whether the settlement is "fair, reasonable and adequate." See, e.g., Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (notice of proposed s'ettlement was sufficient and proposed settlement did not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974) (ten million dollar settlement
was not inadequate as a matter of law); San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (following submission of parties' negotiated settlement,
proposed consent decree which addressed and resolved many of plaintiff's concerns was fair,
reasonable and adequate and would be approved). In applying the test, the trial judge is to
evaluate the following four factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's case balanced against the
amount offered in the settlement; (2) the defendant's ability to pay; (3) the class action's complexity, length, and expense; and (4) the amount of opposition to the settlement. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 72, at § 1.46.
77. Cf. note 105 infra. (The difficulty of assessing the fairness of a settlement is exacerbated
if the class is inadequately represented during the negotiation process.).
78. Generally, courts have not read the rule 23(e) hearing requirement as a mandate to turn
the settlement hearing "into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial" and have limited the scope of the
hearing accordingly. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974). These
courts have reasoned that it would be counterproductive to transform the settlement hearing into
a trial on the merits since the whole purpose of compromises, including class action compromises, is to avoid an extensive trial. See Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172
(5th Cir. 1983) (the court must not try the case in a settlement hearing); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v.
Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. l, 6 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (the settlement hearing should not be
used to stage a minitrial on the merits, the event that the settlement aims to preclude).
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ing test that weaken the substantive inquiry. In addition, the lack of
"adversarialness" in the pretrial class action settlement process forces
the court into an unjustified passivity.79 At the settlement hearing the
court is presented with only one option - the proposed settlement80
- which is the product of negotiations between self-interested parties. 81 The present structure of a rule 23 settlement hearing does not
ensure that the court will hear an alternative viewpoint, one that could
conceivably argue that the proposed settlement was not "fair" to the
absentee class. Without a devil's advocate, and without further information, the court is without the resources to utilize its equity powers
to refashion the settlement82 to meet the interests of the absentee class.
A final factor that militates against close scrutiny of the settlement
terms is the fact that rejection of the settlement would significantly
increase the demands on the court's resources. 83 Class action suits
place a much greater burden on the court's time than ordinary litigation: the issues are more complex, tactics may involve more pretrial
motions and conferences, and more attorneys and parties are involved. 84 Absent a strong showing of inadequacy, it seems highly unlikely that a court would reject a settlement, especially when the
immediate result of doing so would be to burden the court's own
79. Court activism ensures that the interests of the absentee class are not compromised.
Outside the pretrial settlement context, the court takes an active role in ensuring that the class
action device addresses the interests of the absentee class. For example, courts will often create
, subclasses if conflicts within the class are sufficiently pronounced, appoint additional class representatives to ensure adequacy of representation, or order notice to absentee class members. See
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981);
Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1306 (4th Cir. 1978); Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d
1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974); Fernandez-Rogue v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Gill v.
Monroe Co. Dept. of Social Serv., 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); see also Miller, supra note 5, at 667 ("Some of these [class action] cases obligate federal
judges to undertake supervisory tasks requiring enormous expenditures of time and effort, converting their role from one of passive adjudicator of a dispute staged by opposing counsel to that
of active systems manager.").
80. Some courts are predisposed to defer to the negotiated settlement because of the view
that it is the product of an "arms length" transaction. See Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv.
Commn., 527 F. Supp. 751, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also note 2 supra.
81. See notes 27-40 supra and accompanying text.
82. There is some question whether courts are empowered under rule 23 to refashion a settle·
ment if they are able to detect serious abuse. Several appellate courts have disclaimed any authority to impose settlement terms on the parties. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1133 (7th Cir.) ("As an appellate court we are without power
to rewrite the settlement of the parties. We only have the authority to approve or disapprove the
settlement in the form it is presented to us.") (citing Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 111 (7th
Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
83. See Dam, supra note 35, at 52-54.
84. A statistical study of federal cases in the Southern District of New York and Eastern
District of Pennsylvania reports that the typical class action suit consumes more time than four
individual actions. The study measured court time by three variables: the number of motions
filed, the number of briefs submitted, and the number of opinions written. Bernstein, Judicial
Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 360-63 (1978).
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docket and leave numerous class claimants without a ready solution to
their grievance.
B.

The Procedural Inquiry

The lack of a workable substantive standard of review has led
courts to focus the settlement inquiry on the procedural aspects of the
negotiation process. 85 Under rule 23(d) and (e), a court may provide
absentee class members with certain procedural protections to ensure
that their interests are adequately represented in the negotiated settlement, 86 whether or not the class has been certified. 87 One of the options available to the court is to order notice to the class members "of
any step in the action." 88 Unfortunately, reliance on notice as a prophylactic device is illusory because notice does not ensure a substan85. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124
(7th Cir.) (adequacy of representation in the negotiation process is an important factor in evaluating the fairness of the settlement), cert denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d
1298, 1310, 1314 (4th Cir. 1978) (notice of dismissal is a prophylactic device that detects collusion); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978)
(interests of absentee class are protected primarily by procedural safeguards), cert denied, 439
U.S. 1115 (1979); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977) ("sweetheart" <Jeals can be avoided by public disclosure of attorneys' fees); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (the focus of the court on a precertification settlement
proposal should be whether the settlement was the product of collusion).
86. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir.
1978) ("[T]he law accords special protections, primarily procedural in nature, to individual class
members whose interests may be compromised in the settlement process. These protections include notice, ensuring that class members know when their rights are being compromised, and an
opportunity to voice objections to the settlement."), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Magana
v. Platzer, 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[There are] two primary means by which [the
court] properly can carry out the purposes of Rule 23(e): (1) the ordering of settlement notice to
putative class members; and (2) close judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of class counsel's
attorney's fee to be recovered in connection with the proposed settlement."); see also Shelton v.
Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1314 (4th Cir. 1978); Tornabene v. General Dev. Corp., 88 F.R.D. 53, 55
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
87. See note 88 infra.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). Notice becomes mandatory upon certification of the class, and
the class representative must bear the cost. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177
(1974). Rule 23(e) also requires notice whenever a certified class suit is either dismissed or settled. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). Courts disagree on whether notice to class members of a noncertified class settlement should be mandatory when the settlement calls for dismissal of the class
allegation. In Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978), the court held that the lower
court's order of notice of dismissal of a noncertified class claim was an abuse of discretion where
there were insufficient facts to show that putative class members had relied on the class representatives to litigate the case. Remanding the case, the Fourth Circuit instructed the lower court
to inquire "carefully into the circumstances of the settlement, and [make] findings on whether the
settlement was tainted by collusion, or whether absent putative class members, with a reasonable
basis for a 'reliance' expectation, would be prejudiced by the settlement." 582 F.2d at 1316. On
remand, the district court found that the settlement had been tainted by collusion. The court
again ordered notice, arguing that notice should be used as a "prophylactic" device to prevent
collusive settlements. Shelton v. Pargo, 81 F.R.D. 637, 640 (W.D.N.C. 1979). The court reasoned that the absentee class members were in the best position to evaluate whether their own
interests had been compromised.
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tively just settlement or prevent egregious abuses of the class action
process.
Courts generally order notice to prevent collusive settlements and
to ensure that no class member has unduly relied on the representational efforts of the named plaintiffs and thereby forgone the opportunity to bring an individual or class claim. 89 Notice informs the class
members of the circumstances and terms of the settlement so that they
may object to the proposed settlement or intervene in the suit if they
feel their interests have been ignored. Perhaps the most important
function of notice is to inform the class members that the statute of
limitations, which was tolled during the certification decision, has
started to run. 9o
Notice can protect the interests of the absentee class and prevent
collusive settlements if it is indeed successful in eliciting a response
from the absentee class members. 91 More often than not, however,
notice fails to elicit intervention of absentee class members for the
same reason that class members fail to control their representatives:
an active class member incurs significant expenses without receiving
commensurate benefits. 92
Rothman v. Gould 93 illustrates how the inability of notice to elicit
an adequate response renders notice an ineffective tool for preventing
collusive settlements. 94 In Rothman, the defendant offered to settle
89. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (4th Cir. 1978); Mangana v. Platzer Ship·
yard, 74 F.R.D. 61, 67-71 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 482-83 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See generally 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1797 (1972).
90. The Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations must be tolled once a class
action claim is filed. Tolling prevents individual class members from filing their individual actions prior to class certification. This avoids generating a multiplicity of suits. The statute of
limitations begins to run again upon the class certification decision. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co.
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
91. Courts' reliance on notice as a prophylactic device is based on the assumptions that notice will reach and be read by the majority of class members and that notice will motivate some
class member(s) to intervene in the action. These assumptions are probably faulty. First, class
members often have problems in grasping the significance of class suits, even when notice is sent
and received. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321-22
(1973). Second, notice may not be a sufficient inducement for a class member to take on the
responsibilities of representing the class, given that the class representative assumes liability for
attorneys' fees and for any mishandling of the class suit. See generally notes 28-30 supra and
accompanying text. Moreover, notice may well encourage, rather than discourage, abuse. Notice may attract unscrupulous attorneys who would use intervention in an about-to-be settled
class suit as a means of generating fees. Also, notice could make strike suits, see note 94 infra,
even more of a weapon against defendants, because defendants usually would suffer from this
form of unfavorable advertising. See Almod, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Precertijication
Stage: Is Notice Required?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1978); O'Kelley, Class Actions: Proposals for
New Rule of Professional Responsibility, LmGATION, Winter 1979, at 25, 26.
92. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
93. 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
94. Collusive settlements are often the product of strike suits brought by putative class representatives. In general, the strike suit takes on one of three forms. In the first, the plaintiff threatens to bring his individual suit as a class action in order to extract a nuisance value settlement.
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the named plaintiff's individual claim for a sizable sum, but only on
the condition that the plaintiff drop his class allegation.95 The plaintiff's counsel agreed and petitioned the court to decertify the class in
order to "erase the class claims ... so the settlement [could] be consummated. "96 The amendment of the complaint, however, left the
class action suit with no representative. In an attempt to solicit a new
class representative from among the class members, the court ordered
that the members be notified of the status of the suit.97 The court
noted that the class claim would have to be dismissed if the notice
failed to elicit an adequate class representative.9 8 This result eventually occurred because no class member volunteered to represent the
class.
If notice fails to elicit a response, as it is likely to do, the court is
powerless to prevent the abuse of the class action mechanism. Class
representatives and attorneys are then free to use the class action claim
as a private bargaining chip and to ignore the legitimate interests of
the absentee class.
III.

AN

ALTERNATIVE

From the foregoing, it appears that courts must depart from their
current application of rule 23 if they are to assure negotiated settlements that further the legitimate interests of the absentee class. In
tampering with the settlement process, however, the courts must be
careful to remedy the ills of rule 23 without seriously undermining
other important values. For example, they must eliminate the structural incentives that allow the class action device to be abused without
adding significantly to the time and expense of class action litigation.
In addition, they must insure that the interests of the absentee class
members are adequately represented during the negotiation process
without burdening the process to such an extent that settlements,
While this type of strike suit significantly undermines the integrity of the judicial process, it does
not compromise the reliance interests of putative class members, since there is no mechanism to
notify them that a class action has merely been threatened. In the second variation, the plaintiff
actually files a class claim and uses the class action allegation to obtain leverage in negotiating for
a more favorable settlement. See Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670 (D. Ariz. 1978).
The class, having received notice that a class claim has been filed, does have a real reliance interest in the suit. However, precertification dismissal of the class claim would have no binding effect
on claims of individual class members. See generally Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions For
Damages, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 971 (1971); Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1541. In a
third variation, the plaintiff files the class action suit and obtains certification of the class. The
plaintiff then agrees not to amend the complaint to drop the class action allegation and settles
without seeking damages for the unnamed plaintiffs. The class is bound by this settlement because it has been certified. Thus, the defendant protects himself from a future class action suit
and the plaintiff extracts a higher settlement for herself.
95. 52 F.R.D. at 500-01.
96. 52 F.R.D. at 495.
97. 52 F.R.D. at 498-501.
98. 52 F.R.D. at 501.
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which are encouraged by the law,99 are impossible to achieve.
A.

The Mechanism

A court has broad supervisory powers to insure that the class action process is not abused. 100 Under rule 23, a court may issue orders
that affect the conduct of the attorneys, the parties, and any intervenors.101 In addition, rule 83 allows a majority of the judges in a district
to make and amend rules governing its "practice" so long as they are
not inconsistent with other federal rules of civil procedure. 102 However, the court's power to issue orders or institute new court rules is
not unlimited; the court must assess whether the rule or order unduly
infringes on the legal rights of the parties involved, and whether such
infringement is justified by the likelihood of serious abuse.103
Instituting a guardian mechanism is a procedural "modification"104 of rule 23 that can meet these stringent requirements. The
guardian mechanism would work in the following manner. After the
plaintiff files a complaint alleging a class action suit, the court would
appoint a guardian to insure that the interests of the absentee class
members are protected. 105 The guardian would not be a party to the
99. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973); Miller v. Mackey Intl., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
101. Rule 23(d) gives the court wide latitude to issue orders directing conduct in a class
action suit. The rule lists several situations in which the court may issue the necessary and
appropriate orders: "in the presentation of evidence or argument," FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(l);
"imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors," FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(3);
and "requiring the pleading be amended to eliminate [a class action] allegation," FED. R. C1v. P.
23(d)(4). In addition, rule 23(d)(5) states that the court may issue orders concerning "similar
procedural matters."
102. FED. R. C1v. P. 83. Rule 83 authorizes a court to issue orders or adopt local rules if:
(1) the rule or order regulates a "practice," i.e., procedural details and matters not covered by the
rules; and (2) the rule or order is consistent with the federal rules, i.e., the existing substantive
rights of the parties are not materially altered. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1976);
see United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 571 (1958); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508
F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 92
(C.D. Cal. 1980). Under rule 83, the court may control the conduct oflawyers practicing before
it. See Hvass, 355 U.S. at 575; Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Zarate, 86 F.R.D. at 92.
103. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981) ("[T]he mere possibility of abuses
does not justify routine adoption of a [procedure] that interferes with the formation of a class or
the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules. . • . Other, less burdensome
remedies may be appropriate.") (footnote omitted).
104. The proposal, as presented, does not call for a legislative modification of rule 23. The
guardian mechanism can be implemented as a court order under rule 23(d)(3), see note 101 supra
and accompanying text, or in the form of a local rule under rule 83, see note 102 supra and
accompanying text.
105. A court has broad equity powers to appoint a guardian ad !item for a party ifthat party
cannot adequately represent himself. Although a guardian ad !item normally represents the interests of a child, state courts routinely appoint guardians to represent physically or emotionally
encumbered persons and prisoners. Moreover, courts have appointed a guardian to represent the
interests of the absentee class when deciding on the amount of the class attorney's fee. See Haas
v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383-84 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Miller v. Mackey Intl., Inc.,
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proceedings, but a friend of the court 106 - a fact finder who aids the
judge in insuring that the settlement serves the interests of the absentee class. 107 The mechanism would function only during pretrial, and
70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976). In Miller, the court appointed a guardian ad !item for the
class because the assertion that 1845 hours were required to represent the class adequately
"lack[ed] credulity." 70 F.R.D. at 536. The court opined:
Because the interest of the class members is specifically adverse to the interest of their lawyers who seek an attorney's fee to be awarded from the settlement fund, the class members
must be protected. The attorney for the defendant has little concern for the manner in
which the fund is divided. Consequently, the court appointed an experienced attorney as a
guardian ad !item for the members of the class. . . . [T]his procedure both achieves protection for the members of the class and enables the trial judge to remain in an impartial
position. Counsel for the class strenuously objected to the appointment of a guardian ad
!item and asserted that the court should conduct cross examination of the witnesses testifying for plaintiff's counsel. However, that contravenes the court's traditional role, tending to
cast the court into an advocate's role. Although specific authority for the appointment of a
guardian ad !item is not provided for in Rule 23, it is inherent within Rule 23(d).
70 F.R.D. at 535 (citations omitted). In Haas, the court also appointed a guardian ad !item to
represent the interests of the class during the determination of attorneys' fees. The court's reasons for appointing the guardian were similar to those stated in Miller:
Having agreed to contribute a fixed sum of money in settlement of the suit, the proportion of
the fund allocated to counsel fees is of no moment to the defendants. Consequently, defendants do not participate in the fee determination proceedings. The unfortunate result is the
necessity for the judge to assume the advocate's role left unfilled by the defendants' departure. The dilemma thereby created for the Court finds the judge playing "devil's advocate"
on behalf of the disinterested defendants, while at the same time attempting to exercise his
impartiality in making a just determination of reasonable fees. To require the judge to occupy an adversary position during the fee proceedings is highly inconsistent with his acknowledged duty to act as an impartial arbitrator. The appointment of a guardian for the
class obviates this considerable problem of judicial schizophrenia.
77 F.R.D. at 383 (footnote omitted). In both cases the court found that the inability of the
nominal class representative, the class attorney, to represent the class adequately required the
appointment of a third party to protect the class's interests. A similar approach - the addition
of a neutral third party - is appropriate in pretrial class action settlement negotiations. During
this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot ensure that the class is adequately represented. In
theory, a guardian should not be necessary because the named plaintiff and the class attorney are
obligated to represent the class. But given the inherent conflict of interest faced by the representatives and the lack of effective class control over their conduct, the court cannot reasonably rely
on the representatives to speak adequately for the absentee class. See notes 43-66 supra and
accompanying text. Moreover, if the class is misrepresented during the negotiation process, the
"fairness" standard of the settlement hearing does not insure that the court will detect an inadequate settlement. The court may be able to detect irregularities in the negotiation process, yet be
unable to evaluate whether those irregularities produced a collusive settlement because the terms
of the improperly negotiated settlement may fall within the range of "fair" possibilities. See
Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions - Part II: The Settlement, 23
Sw. L.J. 765, 771-72 (1969) ("[F]aimess may be found anywhere within a broad range of lower
and upper limits. No one can tell whether a compromise found to be "fair" might not have been
"fairer" had the negotiating [attorney] possessed better information or been animated by undivided loyalty to the cause of the class.").
106. Cf. Wheatley v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 712, 102 N.W.2d 343, 345 (1960) (a guardian
is not a party in interest but an aid to assert the rights of the party being represented).
107. Courts already make extensive use of neutral third parties as fact finders in the class
action process. The complexity of class action cases have made necessary the appointment of
magistrates, masters, and expert witnesses to help manage the class action device. See, e.g.,
Franks v. Kroger Co., 670 F.2d 71, 72 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (magistrate was responsible
for adjudicating the individual discrimination claims); Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv.
Commn., 473 F. Supp. 801, 818 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (special master appointed to handle the distribution of damages), ajfd., 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
Expert witnesses have aided the courts in understanding technical issues. See, e.g., Kaehni v.
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only if the parties attempted to negotiate a settlement. Thus, parties
wishing to negotiate a settlement would be required to notify the
court, and the court would appoint a guardian.1os
Counsel would be required to conduct any negotiations in the presence of the guardian; however, counsel would be free to agree between
themselves to expand the role of the guardian from a neutral third
party observer to a mediator in the settlement process. As a mediator,
the guardian would assist the parties in arriving at a compromise. In
this role, the guardian would perform a wide range of functions aimed
at conciliation: enhancing communications, presiding over meetings,
identifying general areas of agreement, suggesting possible compromises, and perhaps exerting pressure to reach a solution. 109
The Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523, 527 (D. Md. 1972), ajfd., 473 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
108. The guardian mechanism can be seen as an extension of the pretrial conference, which
can take many forms. Amended rule 16 emphasizes the pretrial conference as a means of con·
trolling and managing complex civil cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Recently, courts have focused on
the judge's role in guiding complex litigation. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d
411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
The pretrial conference, in particular, has been singled out as one of the judge's best tools. See
MANuAL FoR COMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 72, at§ 1.10; Peckham, The Federal Judge as
a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV
770, 774 (1981); Sperlich, Better Judicial Management: The Best Remedy for Complex Cases, 65
JUDICATURE 415, 417-19 (1982). Through the pretrial conference, the judge can insist on clear
and thoughtful organization, so that complex issues can be presented to the jury in a narrow and
simple context. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 427; Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. at 936. A more formal pretrial procedure, statutorily
enacted, is the medical malpractice screening panel. These panels have been created, in various
forms, in 26 states. They are designed to reduce the volume of nonmeritorious suits and to
encourage pretrial settlements of medical malpractice cases. A typical panel, such as the one
used in Arizona, is composed of a judge, a lawyer, and a physician. It conducts an evidentiary
hearing, in which participation is mandatory, to determine whether there is enough evidence to
support a claim against each defendant. The actual gain in efficiency brought by this type of
panel has been questioned by attorneys and judges. See Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 1, at 11;
Howard, An Evaluation ofMedical Liability Review Panels in Arizona, ST. Cr. J., Spring 1981, at
19, 23. Court annexed arbitration is another prehearing procedure that automatically refers a
case to a neutral third party, other than the judge, to promote early settlement of the case. One
version is the "Quick Look" concept where disputants agree to present the merits of their case in
an abbreviated procedure. For example, the Northern District of Ohio has adopted a procedure
in which each party is given one hour to make an opening statement, submit a summation of the
evidence, and make a closing argument before six jurors who deliberate and render a nonbinding
verdict. The parties are given two weeks to consider the jury's findings and may request a full
trial de novo if they are not satisfied. Only three percent of the 80 cases that underwent this
procedure actually went to trial. See Jury Trial That Can Save Time and Money, Bus. WK., July
20, 1981, at 166. Whatever the form of the pretrial procedure, studies have shown that the
emphasis of the pretrial conference can influence the outcome of the litigation. For example, use
of pretrial conferences emphasizing settlement leads to a higher percentage of settlements than
would occur without the conferences. See Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, The Impact of Pre·
trial Conferences: An Interim Report on the Ontario Pretrial Conference Experiment, 15 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 591 (1977). These results have prompted commentators to propose that an
exclusive, separate pretrial conference directed toward settlement can appreciably increase the
rate of voluntary settlements. See Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 1, at 22.
109. See generally Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 1, at 15-18 (discussing different roles judges
play in the settlement process); Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
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If the parties preferred to limit the guardian's role to that of neutral third-party observer, the guardian would not participate in the
settlement negotiations, but would be present at all meetings. The parties would be free to discuss their positions, offers, and counteroffers.
If the parties arrived at a settlement that they wished to submit for
court approval, the guardian would prepare a nonbinding written
memorandum, disclosed only to the judge, outlining the parties' relative strengths and weaknesses as revealed during the negotiations. The
court would use this memorandum as an independent source of information 110 to evaluate the substantive terms of the settlement at the
approval hearing. 111

B. The Advantages
The advantage of the guardian mechanism is that it offers a procedural solution to the structural causes of abuse in class action settlements. By including a neutral third party in the pretrial settlement
process, the mechanism ensures that the negotiation process is not
subverted by the self-interests of the class representatives. If pretrial
negotiations remain uncorrupted, a court is in a better position to protect the interests of the absentee class during the settlement hearing. 112
The introduction of a neutral third party during the settlement negotiations strikes down the veil of secrecy that facilitates improper settlements. It also prevents the plaintiff from using the class action
allegation simply as leverage during the negotiations. 113 If attorneys
did attempt this, the guardian would be free to inform the court. The
court could then review the situation and prevent rather than merely
punish abuses.11 4
305 (1971) (study of different uses of mediation); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 10
F.R.D. 111 (1976) (general examination of alternative dispute resolution systems).
110. The lack of adequate information is a major obstacle confronting a court in its attempt
to carry out its duties under rule 23. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
111. Knowing that the confidential guardian report would serve as a rough guideline for the
trial judge in the settlement hearing, the parties would be motivated to make realistic representations of their positions and offers during the negotiations, thus precluding "unofficial" negotiations. The court could further ensure that the mechanism not be evaded by stipulating that the
absence of the guardian during the negotiation process establishes presumptive proof of collusion. In order to make substantial use of the guardian's contribution, the court should also insist
that the guardian render as objective a representation as possible.
112. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 362-66 (2d Cir. 1982) (weighing heavily the
participation in the settlement negotiations of a government agency committed to protecting the
public interest), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338,
1353 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The participation of a government agency [a neutral third party] in [the
negotiations leading to the settlement] serves to protect the interests of the class against possible
improper dealings."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
113. See note 94 supra.
114. Although the problem of padding of attorneys' fees is not fully treated in this Note, the
guardian mechanism could be used to prevent this type of abuse because the guardian could
verify that activities undertaken on behalf of the class were not duplicative of other attorneys'
efforts. Also, the guardian could keep a tally of the hours that she spends on the settlement
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By allowing the court to undertake a more informed substantive
review of the class action settlement, the guardian mechanism enables
the court to detect collusive settlements. Presently, review of the settlement terms is superficial rather than truly substantive because
courts are not afforded the options 115 or information116 with which to
fashion an equitable settlement. The proposed system would solve
these problems. Courts could use the guardian's report as an independent source of information in evaluating the substantive fairness
of the settlement terms. Moreover, the guardian mechanism could secure the relevant information without compromising the neutrality of
the court, because the court itself would not be involved in the pretrial
negotiation process. 117 At the settlement hearing, the court could use
the information furnished by the guardian to reject those settlement
terms that harm the interests of the absentee class, or to suggest ways
that the compromise could be refashioned. 118
negotiations. The guardian's report of hours, with an evaluation of the difficulty of the issues
discussed, could provide the court with a rough estimate of the hours an attorney would need to
work to represent the class adequately. If the attorney greatly exceeded the necessary hours, her
fee could be adjusted accordingly. Cf. Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (W.D.
Pa. 1977) (the court appointed a guardian to protect the interests of the class since the attorney's
fees were to be taken from the award to the class); Miller v. Mackey Intl., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533,
535 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (the court appointed a guardian ad litem in an action to determine fees of
the attorney, because the attorney's interests in this matter are adverse to those of the class). See
generally note 10 supra. Moreover, the guardian mechanism could prevent strike suits after the
class claim has been filed. See note 94 supra. Strike suits that occur before the class claim is filed
could not be prevented because the guardian mechanism would not yet be in force. See text
preceding note 108 supra.
115. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
117. The danger of prejudgment and bias was described by the Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974):
[A] preliminary determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defen·
dant, since of necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures appli·
cable to civil trials. The court's tentative findings, made in the absence of established
safeguards, may color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the
defendant.
During the negotiation, the guardian should remain neutral in order to facilitate a mediation
process in which the parties themselves negotiate an acceptable settlement. The guardian's main
objective should be to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' contentions. Because
the judge would not be a part of the pretrial settlement negotiations, she would be able to maintain the neutrality required to determine, at the settlement hearing, whether the settlement was
fair, reasonable, and adequate. In making these determinations, however, the judge would have
the benefit of the guardian's inside observations.
118. The settlement process would then resemble the negotiation of a consent decree. As
described by Judge Chayes, the consent decree enables the parties to control the outcome of the
litigation, "[e]ach party recogniz[ing] that it must make some response to the demands of the
other party, for issues left unresolved will be submitted to the court, a recourse that is always
chancy •.•." Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1299 (1976); see also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forums ofJustice,
93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979) (arguing that judges have a duty to uncover the inadequacies of the
class action device and solve them creatively).
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C. Feasibility
The advantages of the guardian mechanism should be weighed
against the potential disadvantages - the monetary cost of instituting
the mechanism and the infringement on the rights of the parties involved. Fortunately, these potential problems are not insurmountable.
A fixed salary for the guardian would best serve the goals of the
guardian mechanism. It would insure the neutrality and thus the
credibility of the guardian by removing any economic incentive to prolong negotiations - an incentive that accompanies a system of hourly
or daily pay. Under this proposal, the guardian would be contracted
for a specific time period that could be extended as necessary.
To finance the guardian mechanism the court would need to establish a fund. This could be done by setting aside a nominal percentage,
perhaps one percent, of all settlement funds produced in class action
suits. 119 The court could also supplement the guardian fund by imposing a monetary penalty on meritless class action suits. 120 This penalty
would also discourage vexatious litigation. 121 To ease the financial
burden, members of the bar wishing to perform pro bono work could
volunteer to be guardians. Other "free" potential guardians are federal magistrates, already paid on a salary basis. 122
The court could ensure that the guardian mechanism did not infringe on the rights of the parties by a court order delineating the
scope of the guardian's activity. 123 The order should emphasize that
the guardian is not to supplant the judge or to advocate a position. If
the guardian violated the court order, the parties could petition the
court for redress. 124 The court could then take the appropriate remedial measures, including dismissal of the guardian. In addition, the
guardian should be required to document all her activities. This
119. In Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 384 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1977), and Miller
v. Mackey Intl., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976), the courts charged the services of the
guardian against the class settlement fund under the co=on fund doctrine. The proposed one
percent charge could be justified as an administrative court cost because any party to a class
action suit would have to utilize the guardian mechanism if they wished to investigate the possibility of a settlement.
120. See Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751, 754-55 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (assessing court
expenses against counsel whom the court found to have misused the class action device).
121. See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, 74 F.R.D. 61, 71 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
122. Magistrates can be assigned "additional duties" in the area of civil litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3) (1976). Magistrates perform a variety of duties as assigned by the trial court. For
example, they hear habeas corpus petitions, resolve discovery disputes, and preside over civil
trials with the consent of the parties. See Smalkin, The Role of United States Magistrates, LmGATION, Spring 1981, at 11.
123. Cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (where the Court upheld the use
of a circuit court's writ of mandamus ordering a district court judge to hear a case which he had
referred to a master).
124. Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680-83 (1980) (where the Court held that a
magistrate's findings are not final but the district court judge can use them in his final determination without a de novo hearing).
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would ensure that the guardian did not overstep the bounds delineated
by the court as well as provide an adequate record for review. 125
Adding a third party to the negotiating process could be seen as an
infringement on the private negotiating rights of the parties. However,
the confidentiality that may be required in settling private claims is not
necessarily justified in the class action context. In that context, more
is involved than the negotiating parties' private concerns. Also of the
import are the interests of the absentee class members and society's
interest in preventing abuse of the class action mechanism. Moreover,
it is not necessary for the guardian to be an intrusive force in the negotiating process. Indeed, the parties themselves have some control over
the degree of the guardian's intrusion since they determine whether
the guardian is to act as a passive third-party observer or an active
mediator. 126 Therefore, the guardian mechanism should not unduly
disrupt the settlement process. Instead, it should preclude only those
settlements resulting from an improper use of the class action
device. 127
CONCLUSION

The guardian mechanism is not designed to eliminate all of the
intrinsic weaknesses of the class action device. Rather, the guardian
mechanism attempts to preclude abuse of the class action device during the pretrial negotiation stage of a class action suit, when the class
action device is most vulnerable to abuse. By appointing a neutral
third party to preside over the settlement negotiations, the court can
maintain the integrity of the settlement process. This will help guarantee a responsible substantive review hearing rather than the current
superficial scrutiny that at best can detect the possibility of abuse, but
cannot adequately address the problem. Thus, the guardian mechanism furthers the policy ends of rule 23. It precludes collusive settlements and guarantees that the interests of the absentee class are
considered at the settlement hearing without discouraging class action
litigation.
- Sylvia R. Lazos
125. Cf. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 435 (1968) ("It is essential ••• that a
reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at
after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval
phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the
law.").
126. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
127. Cf. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20
(7th Cir.) ("To the extent [that an inquiry into the conduct of the negotiations] discourages
settlements, it should only discourage those negotiated in circumstances so irregular as to cast
substantial doubt on their fairness."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).

